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CASE COMMENTS
ZINERMON v. BURCH: THE COURT SHOOTS DOWN A PARRATT
"I don't know whether I'm coming or going, Can't cover up be-
cause it's obviously showing. It's a state, state of confusion ....
We're in a state, state of confusion."
The Kinks'
UNDER 42 U.S.C § 1983,2 a plaintiff can sue state government
officials in federal court upon showing that the officials com-
mitted a violation of federal law while acting under color of state
law.3 However, in series of cases beginning in 1981, the Su-
preme Court of the United States sharply circumscribed the abil-
ity of plaintiffs to use section 1983 when alleging a fourteenth
amendment procedural due process violation.4 The Court's recent
decision in Zinermon v. Burch,5 though, seemingly demonstrates a
new-found willingness to give procedural due process plaintiffs a
section 1983 remedy.
A "hurt and disoriented" Darrell Burch was discovered
roaming a Florida highway and taken to a private mental health
1. The Kinks, State of Confusion, STATE OF CONFUSION, 1983 Arista Records, Inc.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 reads: "Every person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law ....
3. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (discussed infra notes 24-26 and ac-
companying text).
4. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984);
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). For a more detailed discussion of'these cases,
see notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
5. 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990).
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care facility in Tallahassee on December 7, 1981.6 After signing
consent forms, Burch was treated with psychotropic medication
and subsequently diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. Several
days later, Burch was referred for further care to Florida State
Hospital (FSH) in Chattohoochee, a state-run facility for the
mentally ill. On December 10, Burch signed various forms, includ-
ing one entitled "Request for Voluntary Admission," 7 whereupon
he was admitted for treatment at FSH as a voluntary patient.8
Under Florida law, a voluntary patient is any adult "making ap-
plication [for admission to the mental hospital] by express and
informed consent," provided he is "found to show evidence of
mental illness and to be suitable for treatment."9
Doctor Marlus Zinermon, a staff physician at FSH,. ex-
amined Burch the day he was admitted, noting that the patient
was "'refusing to cooperate,' would not answer questions, 'appears
distressed and confused,' and 'related that medication had been
helpful.' "10 The next day, a "nursing assessment form" stated
that "Burch was confused and unable to state the reason for his
hospitalization and still believed that '[t]his is heaven.' "I' On De-
cember 29, a report prepared by Dr. Zinermon stated that "on
6. Id. at 979. The mental health care facility was Apalachee Community Mental
Health Services (ACMHS). Although a named defendant in Burch's suit, ACMHS did not
petiition for certiorari. Id. at 979, n.4.
7. Id. at 979-80.
8. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.465(1)(a) (West 1986). The statutory definition of "ex-
press and informed consent" is "consent voluntarily given in writing after sufficient expla-
nation and disclosure. . . to enable the person . . . to make a knowing and willful decision
without any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or coer-
cion." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.455(22) (West 1986).
Under Florida law, a person can be admitted to a state mental facility in four different
ways. As discussed above, one can be a "voluntary patient." Second, a person can be ad-
mitted "for short term emergency administration." Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 981. This in-
volves a maximum stay of 48 hours, provided the person is mentally ill, in need of care, and
lacks the capacity to be admitted as voluntary patient. Id. Third, a person may be detained
for up to five days pursuant to a court order. Id. Finally, a person may be held as an
involuntary patient, provided that person is likely to injure himself, and is in need of care
"and ... the facility administrator and two mental health professionals recommend invol-
untary placement. Id. "Before involuntary placement, the patient has the right to notice, a
judicial hearing, appointed counsel, access to medical records and personnel, and an inde-
pendent expert examination." Id. The person can be held for a maximum of six months,
unless a court order extends the detention. Id.
This is a description of the 1981 statutory scheme, under which Burch was admitted
for treatment. Since 1981, Florida has amended these statutes. See id. at 981, n.10.
9. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 980.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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admission, Burch had been 'disoriented, semi-mute, confused and
bizarre in appearance and thought . . . not cooperative to the ini-
tial interview,' and 'extremely psychotic, appeared to be paranoid
and hallucinating.' "12
Approximately five months after admission to FHS, Burch
was released. No hearing on his hospitalization and treatment was
held during that period.' 3 Upon release, "Burch complained that
he had been admitted inappropriately to FHS and did not remem-
ber signing a voluntary admission form."' 4 A state agency15 inves-
tigated the complaint, finding that although Burch had indeed
signed a voluntary admission form, "there was 'documentation
that you were heavily medicated and disoriented on admission and
...you were probably not competent to be signing legal docu-
ments." 6 Moreover, "the hospital administration was made aware
that they were very likely asking medicated clients to make deci-
sions at a time when they were not mentally competent.' 17 ,
In February, 1985, Burch brought suit under section 1983
against eleven individuals who worked at FHS, alleging that they
"deprived him of his liberty without due process of law, by admit-
ting him to FSH as a 'voluntary' mental patient when he was in-
competent to give informed consent to his admission.""' Specifi-
cally, Burch argued that since he was wrongly admitted as a
voluntary patient, he did not receive the procedural safeguards af-
forded by Florida law to those patients classified as
"involuntary."' 9
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for a failure to state a claim."0 A panel




15. The Florida Human Rights Advocacy Committee investigated the complaint.
The Committee is part of Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services. Id.
16. Id. These findings were summarized in a letter sent to Burch dated April 4,
1984.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 977.
19. Id. at 977. For a description of the procedural safeguards provided by the "invol-
untary" admission process, see supra note 8.
20. Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc., 804 F.2d 1549
(llth Cir. 1986).
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affirmed,21 but upon a rehearing in banc, the Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's decision.2"
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the in
banc Court of Appeals, holding that Burch had stated a proce-
dural due process claim under section 1983.3 Not only was the
Court's decision surprising, given its previous reluctance to allow
such claims, but it seemed to signal a retreat from what had been
a firm rule for dealing with cases of this type. This Comment will
focus on the Zinermon decision, its departure from earlier prece-
dent, and the confusion the decision is bound to generate.
I. BACKGROUND
In Monroe v. Pape,24" the Supreme Court held that govern-
ment officials could be sued in federal court under section 1983,
irrespective of whether a state remedy already existed. 5 To be
successful, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the officials
committed a violation of federal law while acting under color of
state law. 26 Beginning in 1981, however, a trilogy of Court deci-
sions added a new twist to certain section 1983 claims: the availa-
bility of state remedies.
The first case in the trilogy was Parratt v. Taylor." Respon-
dent was an inmate in a Nebraska prison who ordered hobby
materials through the mail.28 Although he paid for the materials,
and although they were delivered to the prison, the respondent
never received them.29 A suit was brought under section 1983 to
recover the value of the materials.30 Respondent alleged that the
prison warden and hobby manager "deprived him of property
21. Zinermon, 110 S.Ct. at 978.
22. Burch v. Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc., 840 F.2d 797
(IIth Cir. 1988).
23. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. 990.
24. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
25. Id. at 183 ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.").
26. Id. at 171-87 (The Court, in a lengthy discussion, determined that the scope of
section 1983 extended to state officials acting under the authority of state law.) Subsequent
cases extended Monroe to suits against the government itself, Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and allowed suits not only for federal constitutional
violations, but for violations of federal statutory law as well. Maine v. Thiboutout, 448 U.S.
1 (1980).
27. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
28. The value of the materials was $23.50. Id. at 529.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 530.
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without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'" The Court rejected the fourteenth amendment proce-
dural due process claim, holding that no section 1983 remedy ex-
isted when a state employee, acting randomly and without
authorization, negligently deprived an individual of property, pro-
vided that the state makes available a meaningful post-deprivation
remedy, 2
Three years later, the Court expanded upon the Parratt hold-
ing in Hudson v. Palmer.33 During a "shakedown" search, Vir-
ginia state prison officers allegedly destroyed the personal property
of Palmer, a prison inmate.3 4 Palmer sued the prison officials, al-
leging that he was intentionally deprived of property without due
process. The Court ruled against Palmer holding that unautho-
rized and random intentional deprivations of property by a state
employee do not give rise to a section 1983 procedural due process
claim unless the state post-deprivation remedy is inadequate or
non-existent.35
Finally, in 1986, Daniels v. Williams36 was decided. In Dan-
iels, a Virginia state prisoner slipped on a pillow negligently left in
a stairway. 7 As with the earlier cases, the plaintiff sued his jailers
under a section 1983 procedural due process theory, alleging that
the state employees' negligence deprived him of liberty without
due process, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.38 Once
again, the Court refused to entertain the claim. More importantly,
the Court overruled Parratt, in part, by stating that the due pro-
cess clause is never implicated by a negligent act of an official that
causes an unintended loss of life, liberty, or property. 9 Thus, the
question of whether or not adequate post-deprivation remedies ex-
isted was irrelevant; due process can never be violated where the
state official acts negligently.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 543-44. The rationale for the decision was that the state cannot predict
when loss of property will occur where the loss is occasioned by a random, unauthorized
act. Thus, a predeprivation hearing would be difficult, if not impossible to provide. Hence,
a post-deprivation remedy was sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 541.
33. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
34. Id. at 519-20.
35. Id. at 533.
36. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
37. Id. at 328.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 330-31.
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Taken together, Parratt, Hudson, and Daniels seemed to
stand for two simple propositions. First, random, unauthorized, in-
tentional deprivations of property did not constitute grounds for a
section 1983 procedural due process claim, so long as adequate
state post-deprivation remedies were available. Second, random,
unauthorized, negligent deprivations of life, liberty, or property
would never give rise to a section 1983 procedural due process
claim. While the second of these propositions remains unchanged
by the decision in Zinermon v. Burch, the validity of the first pro-
position is now in question.
II. ZINERMON v. BURCH
A. The Majority Opinion
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the proce-
dural due process violations alleged by Burch were sufficient to
state a claim under section 1983. Writing for a majority of five,
Justice Blackmun held that Burch's complaint did indeed make
out a section 1983 claim. 0
The Court began its analysis by characterizing Burch's alle-
gations as falling within the confines of procedural due process -
a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. 1 As such, "the existence of state remedies is relevant in a
special sense," '42 because the constitutional violation does not be-
come actionable "unless and until the State fails to provide due
process."4 3
To comply with the requirements of procedural due process,
the state must usually provide a pre-deprivation hearing." How-
ever, in certain cases, "postdeprivation tort remedies are all the
process that is due, simply because they are the only remedies the
40. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 990 (1990). Since this was a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, the Court did not pass on the merits of Burch's claim. Id. at 979. Joining Justice
Blackmun's opinion were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 977.
41. Id. at 983-84. The Court stated that there are "three kinds of section 1983
claims that may be brought against the State under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 983. The first category includes violations of those rights enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights which were incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Substantive due process violations make up the second category,
while the third category consists of procedural due process violations. Id.
42. Id. at 983.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 984 (citing seven cases supporting this proposition).
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State could be expected to provide.' 45 In these situations, the Par-
ratt/Hudson rule is utilized for section 1983 claims.46
According to the Court, however, application of the Parratti
Hudson rule is not automatic. The rule will not control if
"predeprivation procedural safeguards could address the risk of
deprivations of the kind" the plaintiff alleges, 47 To determine
whether the rule applies, a two step analysis is required.
First, the Court must identify the risk involved. In the pre-
sent case, there was a danger of a person "being confined indefi-
nitely without benefit of the procedural safeguards of the involun-
tary placement process."'48 In other words, the risk was that a
person would be admitted to a mental hospital as a voluntary pa-
tient despite being unable to give the requisite consent by reason
of his incompetence.
Second, the effectiveness of predeprivation safeguards in rela-
tionship to the identified risk must be evaluated. For three rea-
sons, the Court held that predeprivation remedies "would be of
use in preventing the kind of deprivation alleged. '49 To begin
with, the deprivation of Burch's liberty was predictable because it
occurred "at a specific . . . point in the admission process'-
when a patient is given admission forms to sign." 5 This made the
case different from Parratt, because "[w]hile [the state] could an-
ticipate that prison employees would occasionally lose property
through negligence, it certainly '[could not] predict precisely when
the loss will occur.'-"1
45. Id. at 985.
46. The primary rationale behind the Parratt/Hudson rule was that the random,
unauthorized nature of the alleged constitutional violation was so unpredictable as to make
pre-deprivation safeguards impossible to provide. Id, at 985.
A threshold issue in the Zinermbn case was whether Parratt and Hudson applied to
the deprivation of liberty. Parratt and Hudson involved deprivations of property, and sev-
eral Courts of Appeals had limited application of the Parratt/Hudson rule to property
cases. See id. at 978, n.2; id. at 986 n.16. However, the Court refused to make "a categori-
cal distinction between a deprivation of liberty and one of property," id. at 986, holding
that "the fact that a deprivation of liberty is involved in this case does. not automatically
preclude application of the Parratt rule." Id. at 987.
47. Id. at 987.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 990.
50. Id. at 989.
51. Id. (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981)). Similarly, "in Hud-
son, the State might be able to predict that guards occasionally will harass or persecute
prisoners they dislike, but cannot 'know when such deprivations will occur.'" Id. (quoting
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)).
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Another reason for the Court's decision was that the State
could have provided adequate predeprivation process.52 In fact,
there was an involuntary admissions procedure already in place.53
The real problem was that the state employees failed to follow
procedure.54 It was therefore incumbent upon the state to limit
and guide "petitioners' power to admit patients."55 The Court sug-
gested that such limitations on admitting patients could easily
have been formulated prior to the deprivation of Burch's liberty.56
On the other hand, predeprivation process was impossible in Hud-
son and Parratt.5 7
- A final reason was that Florida delegated to its employees
"the power and authority to effect the very deprivation com-
plained of here . . . and . . . the concomitant duty to initiate the
procedural safeguards set up by state law to guard against unlaw-
ful confinement." 58 Thus, the majority seemed to characterize the
petitioners' actions as "authorized." In contrast, the behavior of
the employees in Parratt and Hudson was "unauthorized" since
they, "had no similar broad authority to deprive prisoners of their
personal property, and no similar duty to intitiate . . . the proce-
dural safeguards required before deprivations occur."59
To summarize, the Court held that the Parratt/Hudson rule
was inapplicable, given the risks involved in Zinermon, because
the deprivation was predictable and authorized, and because
predeprivation process was possible. Hence, Burch's complaint
stated a section 1983 procedural due process claim, despite the
availability of post-deprivation remedies.
B. The Dissent
Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, argued that the
52. Id.
53. See supra note 8; Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 989.
54. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 989.
55. Id. at 989. The Court remarked that "it would indeed be strange to allow state
officials to escape § 1983 liability for failing to provide constitutionally required procedural
protections, by assuming that those procedures would be futile because the same state offi-
cials would find a way to subvert them." Id. at 990.
56. Id. at 989.
57. Id. at 989-90. Id. For example, the prison guard in Hudson was "bent upon
effecting the substantive deprivation and would have done so despite any and all
predeprivation safeguards."
58. Id. at 990.
59. Id.
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Parratt/Hudson rule was controlling, and therefore, the case was
properly dismissed by the district court. Although a bit jumbled,
the dissent focused on two major flaws in the majority opinion.
Primarily, Justice O'Connor thought that despite the efforts
made by the majority to distinguish Parratt and Hudson from the
present case, the Parratt/Hudson rule should have applied."0
Clearly, wrote Justice O'Connor, the employees' actions were ran-
dom and unauthorized. Without authorization, the defendants
failed to follow the procedure set forth by the State. Moreover,
the alleged wanton or reckless nature of the deprivation indicated
randomness. 61 Therefore, "[t]he State could not foresee the par-
ticular contravention," 6 2 making predeprivation process impossible
to provide. Equally evident was the availability of adequate
postdeprivation remedies.63 On its face, then, Zinermon should
have been controlled by Parratt and Hudson.64
The dissenters argued that in holding Parratt and Hudson
inapplicable, the majority created non-existent distinctions be-
tween the cases. For example, the deprivation in Zinermon was
quite unpredictable. Although Florida "may be able to predict
that over time some state actors will subvert its clearly implicated
requirements," 65 it cannot predict exactly when the loss will
occur.
66
Also, it was impracticable for the State to provide
predeprivation remedies in the dissent's view. Even if, as the ma-
jority suggested, additional safeguards were in place, the wanton
and reckless state actor "so indifferent to guaranteed protections
would be no more prevented from working the deprivation ...
than would the mail handler in Parratt or the prison guard in
Hudson . . . .Additional safeguards designed to secure correct
results . . . do not practicably forestall state actors who flout the
State's command and established practice. 67
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's
60. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 992 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. The adequacy of the post-deprivation remedies was not disputed in Zinermon. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 993 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor speculated that in Par-
ratt and Hudson, the state did "provide a range of predeprivation requirements and safe-
guards guiding both prison searches and care of packages." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 994 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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suggestion "that this case differs from Parratt and Hudson be-
cause petitioners possessed a sort of delegated power,"68 a delega-
tion which in effect authorized their actions. To the contrary, the
"petitioners no more had the delegated power to depart from the
admission procedures and requirements than did the guard in
Hudson to exceed the limits of his established search and seizure
authority, or the prison official in Parratt wrongfully to withhold
or misdeliver mail." 9 As such, the deprivation of Burch's liberty
was caused not by established state procedure but by unautho-
rized acts.7 0 "Each of the Court's distinctions [,therefore,] aban-
dons an essential element of the Parratt and Hudson doctrines,
and together they disavow those cases' central insights and
holdings.'
The second major flaw in the majority opinion, noted Justice
O'Connor, was that the Court improperly considered the adequacy
of the State's predeprivation safeguards.72 By holding that peti-
tioners' discretion could have been more limited by the State, the
Court in effect passed judgment on the question of what
predeprivation safeguards were mandated by the due process
clause. That inquiry would have been better left to a direct chal-
lenge against the procedures in place, rather than to a challenge
against the propriety of actions taken by state employees pursuant
to procedure.73
Moreover, argued Justice O'Connor, the Court's analysis of
the adequacy of process undermines the due process doctrine em-
bodied in Mathews v. Eldridge.7 1 Instead of evaluating the proce-
dures at issue using the Mathews doctrine, which entails a balanc-
ing of government and private interests along with consideration
of the effectiveness of additional procedures,76 a court must now
look to Zinermon and ask whether a state "fully circumscribed
and guided officials' exercise of power and provided additional
safeguards, without regard to their efficacy or the nature of the
government interest."7 6 That inquiry guts Mathews by obfuscat-
68. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 995 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 996-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 995-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
75. Id. at 338.
76. Zinermon, 110 S. Ct. at 996 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ing the neat line between pre- and post-deprivation safeguards.
These deficiencies in the majority opinion, warned Justice
O'Connor, make the "Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law
to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be admin-
istered by the States.""
III. ANALYSIS
Whatever the vices of the Parratt/Hudson rule, it has one
primary virtue: simplicity. Succinctly stated, the rule provides that
random, unauthorized, intentional deprivations of a constitution-
ally protected interest in life, liberty, or property by a state em-
ployee are not sufficient to state a procedural due process claim
under section 1983, unless the State's post-deprivation remedies
are either non-existent or inadequate. 8 Such a rule is straightfor-
ward and easy to apply. Few questions need be asked, and there
are few lines to draw. Whether post-deprivation remedies exist
and whether they are adequate would seem to be the only real
determinations a court has to make under the Parratt/Hudson ap-
proach. Thus, a court utilizing this rule should have little trouble
handling a complaint alleging a section 1983 procedural due pro-
cess claim.
Zinermon though, complicates what was a straightforward,
rule-oriented analysis by focusing not on the rule itself, but on the
rationale behind the rule and the circumstances giving rise to the
claim. The rationale for the decisions in Parratt and Hudson was
that given the random, unauthorized nature of the state em-
ployee's action, it would be impossible to predict when a depriva-
tion would occur, and therefore, impracticable to provide a pre-
deprivation process which would eliminate the risk of a depriva-
tion occuring in the first place.7
The Zinermon majority ignored the rule hatched from the
Parratt/Hudson rationale, choosing instead to re-examine that ra-
tionale. For example, the impossibility of providing predeprivation
process no longer is an invariable factor when the state employee
acts randomly and in an unauthorized manner. Now, the Court
will look at the limits and controls on whatever predeprivation
77. Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544
(1981)).
78. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
79. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 985 (1990).
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process existed at the time of the constitutional violation.8" In
other words, faced with a section 1983 procedural due process
claim based on a random, unauthorized act, the Court will not
regard the provision of predeprivation remedies as impossible,
which was a prerequisite to applying the Parratt/Hudson rule, but
will instead examine the sufficiency of the predeprivation process,
if any exists.
Although it might be an overstatement to say that by concen-
trating on the rationale, the Zinermon majority eliminated the
Parratt/Hudson rule, they certainly placed it on the backburner.
In effect, the Zinermon majority created a two-part test. The
Court must first, in a multi-factor analysis derived from the Par-
ratt/Hudson rationale, determine "whether predeprivation proce-
dural safeguards could address the risk of deprivations."'" In-
cluded among the Court's considerations during this stage of the
analysis are what kind of deprivation is involved; whether there is
a certain point where a deprivation is likely to occur; whether
there was a predeprivation process already established, and if so,
could it it have been more limited and controlled; and whether the
state employees had some sort of delegated authority to deprive
plaintiffs of a protected interest.8 2 Only if the Court determines
that predeprivation process would indeed have been impossible
and impracticable does the Parratt/Hudson rule come into play.
The end result of Zinermon is bound to be confusion. Plain-
tiffs will argue that Zinermon precludes application of Parratt
and Hudson, defendants will argue that their case falls under the
Parratt/Hudson rule, and the courts hearing these arguments will
not know which way to turn. Certainly, the initial inquiry in the
Zinermon two-step analysis will be difficult to answer. Consider,
for example, the issue of whether the deprivation was unpredict-
able, which is a factor to consider in the Zinermon analysis. The
majority in Zinermon said that the deprivation was predictable
because it occured at a specific point - "when a patient is given
admission forms to sign." 83 On the other hand, in Hudson "the
-State might be able to predict that guards occasionally will harass
or persecute prisoners they dislike, but cannot 'know when such
80. Id. at 989-90.
81. Id. at 987.
82. See id. at 987-90.
83. Id. at 989.
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deprivations will occur.' "4
Another court, however, could have an entirely opposite view
of the two cases. The deprivation in Zinermon might have been
unpredictable because no one could be sure when exactly Burch
would be given the admission papers to sign, or on what day he
would be admitted to the hospital. Similarly, a court would be
justified in finding that the deprivation in Hudson was predictable,
since it occured at a predictable point in the prison day, specifi-
cally, during a routine shakedown search.
Whenever a court entertains a section 1983 procedural due
process claim, it will routinely be forced to make these arbitrary
decisions -- distinctions without a difference. Predictability, which
was assured by the Parratt/Hudson rule, becomes an elusive goal
under the Zinermon approach, as evidenced by the obscure dis-
tinctions made by the Zinermon Court between the facts of that
case and the facts of Parratt and Hudson.85 As a result, Plaintiff
A could lose his case before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, while Plaintiff B might win a virtually iden-
tical claim before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
Thus, there seems to be little left of the Parratt/Hudson rule
after Zinermon. But this might not be all bad. Despite the confu-
sion and headaches that will result from Zinermon, the Court's
decision has two potential virtues. First, it opens the door to fed-
eral court for section 1983 procedural due process plaintiffs. Since
the advent of the Parratt/Hudson rule, that entrance had been
virtually sealed.
84. Id. (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533).
85. The dissent was correct in asserting that there was no significant factual differ-
ence between Zinermon, Parratt, and Hudson. See id. at 991-92 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
Courts have just recently begun the confusing process of applying Zinermon. In Caine
v. Hardy, 905 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1990), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found that pre-deprivation procedural due process was not impossible to provide in
a case involving the loss of a physician's staff privileges, and therefore held that the plain-
tiff had stated a section 1983 claim. A vigorous dissent agreed with the majority as to the
meaning of Zinermon, but not its application to the facts of the case. Id. at 863-67 (Jones,
J., dissenting). The dissent would have applied the Hudson/Parratt rule to deny plaintiff
his section 1983 claim. Id. at 867 (Jones, J., dissenting).
The debate between the majority and the dissent in Caine illustrates the confusion
Zinermon is bound to engender. This particular debate may not be over because the Fifth
Circuit has decided to try their hand on the issue again by agreeing to rehear Caine in
bane. Id. Other courts will no doubt experience similar difficulties in wrestling with
Zinermon.
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More importantly, the decision reverses a possible trend
which could have drastically limited the use of section 1983. Par-
ratt, Hudson, and Daniels, on their face, apply only to fourteenth
amendment procedural due process claims. However, that trilogy
was not expressly limited to such violations. Conceivably, if the
State provided adequate remedies for other constitutional viola-
tions (i.e., an illegal search and seizure), section 1983 could be
unavailable in those cases, too. Zinermon might be an admission
by the Court, though, that it had gone too far in Parratt and
Hudson. In that case, it would be unlikely that the Court would
extend the Parratt/Hudson rule beyond the procedural due pro-
cess area to other constitutional violations.
Zinermon, then, offers a mixed bag: new opportunities for
section 1983 procedural due process plaintiffs, retained opportuni-
ties for other section 1983 plaintiffs, confusion and unpredictabil-
ity for litigators, judges, and everyone else. The Court, of course,
could have offered interested parties a more consistent package if
it had either followed the Parratt/Hudson rule, a result easily
reached given the factual similarities between the cases, or re-
jected it. Unfortunately, the Court did neither, with the end result
being a very forgettable, virtually useless opinion. Such an impor-
tant issue deserved a better effort.
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